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continued.
Finally, noting the conflict between antitrust and labor law
policies, the court found that where a collective bargaining ar-
rangement is established and a valid agreement formed, federal la-
bor law, not antitrust law, controls. Thus, the court granted the
NBA the declaration it sought, finding that the continued imple-
mentation of these policies, despite the expiration of the formal
collective bargaining agreement, does not violate antitrust laws as
the Players alleged, as long as the collective bargaining relation-
ship exists.
The court also noted that, even if the nonstatutory exemption
did not apply, the Players' charge that such practices comprise a
per se violation of the Sherman Act would be insufficient. Profes-
sional athletic associations are characterized primarily as joint ven-
tures, and are judged under the rule of reason, an analysis of mar-
ket power and structure designed to assess the actual effects of any
practices in question. The Players failed to show that the alleged
restraints on trade were unreasonably anti-competitive. In fact, the
court pointed out that the college draft, right of first refusal and
salary cap had pro-competitive effects, especially that of maintain-
ing competitive balance throughout the NBA, that may outweigh
any restrictive consequences. Thus, the Players' counterclaims
were denied.
C.K.
PONCA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA V. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, No. 92-6331,
No. 93-2018, No. 93-2020, No. 93-3110 1994 U.S. App. Lexis
24084 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994)
This appeal raises Tenth and Eleventh Amendment questions
dealing with the process Indian tribes and states utilize in setting
up gaming facilities on Indian reservations. In 1988, in response to
the proliferation of Indian gaming operations, Congress enacted
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). IGRA is designed to
promote strong leadership and tribal economic development as a
result of gaming facilities, and to provide a federal and state regu-
latory function to prevent the infiltration of organized crime and
other corrupting influences.
IGRA classifies gaming operations into three degrees, impos-
ing various forms of federal, state and tribal regulations over each
class. Class I gaming, consisting of "social games for minimal
prizes" or as part of tribal celebrations, falls under the complete
regulatory control of the tribal governments. Class II gaming, con-
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sisting of bingo and similar games, lotto and non-banking card
games, is permitted only if the state where the gaming is located
allows such activity. Assuming the state permits such gaming, In-
dian tribes maintain regulatory jurisdiction, subject to the supervi-
sion of the Department of the Interior. These appeals stem from
Class III gaming, described by IGRA "as all forms of gaming not
included in Classes I and II, e.g., banking card games, slot ma-
chines, casinos, horse and dog racing, and jai-alai." Such gaming is
permitted on Indian lands only if it is legal in the state where the
gaming is located and is conducted in conformance with a compact
between the Indian tribe and the state. To facilitate this, IGRA
directs the states to "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith"
to craft a compact governing Class III gaming.
Negotiations involving the four Indian tribes that brought
these suits (the "Tribes") and the states of Kansas, New Mexico
and Oklahoma failed, and the Tribes sued, seeking an injunction
under IGRA requiring the states to negotiate compacts. The
Tribes also sought an order directing the governors of Oklahoma
and New Mexico to negotiate compacts, thus raising an Ex Parte
Young question.1 Each state moved to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, and two of the states contended that IGRA
violated the Tenth Amendment as well. Oklahoma and New Mex-
ico also claimed the tribes could not obtain injunctive relief against
their governors under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
The district courts reached differing conclusions on the states'
defenses, with three dismissing the Tribes' suits, holding the suits
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Congress lacked
the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. The same three courts also held that the suits against the
governors of Oklahoma and New Mexico fell outside the parame-
ters of Ex Parte Young because a court order to negotiate a tribal-
state compact would infringe upon executive discretion. Finally,
these three courts held that IGRA violates the Tenth Amendment
because it does not allow the states the option to refuse to regulate
Class III gaming, and allows the Secretary of the Interior to com-
mandeer state governments. In the fourth case, the court held that
Congress does have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
Held: Although the Eleventh Amendment imposes a constitu-
tional limitation on the jurisdiction of Article III courts, Congress
1. Under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the courts may consider a suit against
a state official to enjoin a non-discretionary violation of federal law.
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may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity as long
as it makes its intent unmistakably clear in the statute that em-
powers Congress with abrogation rights. Since IGRA specifically
empowers federal courts to entertain causes of action initiated by
an Indian tribe arising out of a state's failure to enter into negotia-
tions with the tribe, and because the statute places the burden on
the states to prove good faith, the court found Congress unmistak-
ably expressed its intent to subject states to suit in federal court.
In determining whether Congress has the power to abrogate, the
court looked to the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
saying the key question is whether the Indian Commerce Clause
gives Congress the plenary power to legislate in the area of Indian
affairs. The court held that it does, giving Congress no less author-
ity than it has under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
The court also held that IGRA does not violate the Tenth
Amendment because the "good faith" provision does not directly
compel states to enact a legislative program, but merely invites
them to do so. If a state chooses not to enter into a tribal-state
compact, the Secretary of the Interior will ultimately prescribe and
enforce regulations to govern Class III gaming.
Additionally, since Class III gaming is only permissible on In-
dian lands in states where such activity is legal, states are free to
outlaw such gaming and need not worry about negotiating with the
Indian tribes. This also preserves state governmental accountabil-
ity, a critical component of the states' Tenth Amendment
Sovereignty.
Finally, the court held that since the act of negotiating in-
volves discretion and is not ministerial in nature, the suits against
the governors of Oklahoma and New Mexico are not barred by Ex
Parte Young. Since IGRA names only the state as a party to a
potential suit, the court found that an injunction to compel a gov-
ernor to enter into a compact with an Indian tribe is improper.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
C.L.
GORDON & BREACH SCI. PUBLRS. S.A. v. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
PHYSICS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11435 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
Plaintiffs Gordon & Breach (G&B) publish and distribute a
wide range of technical, scientific, medical, commercial and busi-
ness journals and books. Defendants, the American Institute of
Physics (AIP) and the American Physical Society (APS), are non-
profit physics societies that publish physics journals. G&B brought
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